As the Pakistan Army surges into Waziristan, Madiha Luqman notes that soon it may be forced to intrervene elsewhere - a situation that could test the army's loyalty

On Sunday, the Pakistani Army launched a new military offensive named Operation Rah-i-Nijat in Southern Waziristan. This operation had been long in planning but it seems that recent attacks on Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore catalysed the army’s response to go after Tehrik-e-Taliban's pockets in Waziristan. Whereas recently all such attacks were sourced directly to militants in Waziristan, recent attacks in Lahore - attributed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban to its sister cell in Punjab, Amjad Farooqi - may have forced an unsettling realisation amongst both intelligence agencies and government that the hotbed of militancy may in near future shift from Southern Waziristan to Southern Punjab.


In a report for the BBC, Orla Guerin elaborates on the growing threat of Taliban extending beyond the Pashtun borders into the heart of Punjab. However it must be noted that existence of militancy in Punjab is not a recent phenomena and has been around for decades. Many outfits such as Hafiz Saeed’s Jamat-ud-Dawa in Muridke, Maulana Masood Azhar’s Jaishe Mohammad in Bahalwapur and Sipah Sahaba among many others, were created and continued to flourish throughout the 80s under the patronage of President Zia, and later various intelligence agencies, to serve the state's geopolitical as well as internal agendas.

As Hasan Askar Rizvi, a prominent defence analyst, in his recent editorial to the Daily Times ‘A State of Denial’ mentions, historically two kinds of militant outfits have existed in Punjab; sectarian and Kashmir oriented. Both kinds of outfits were extremely active in the 90s while the state’s goals were still harmonious with the militant's Islamist cause, However, by early 2000s, sectarian outfits such as Sipha Sahaba fizzled out under crackdown from the Government, whilst the Kashmir oriented outfits diverted their attention to combating American presence in Afghanistan. In other cases as Guerin points out, some of these outfits got a new lease of life, when Al Qaeda moved into take over these organizations and tapped into their pool of resources.

What is significant about groups in Southern Punjab is that it is only recently that they have initiated a shift in the tactics. Up until now, groups in Southern Punjab according to Rizvi kept a low profile presence providing only logistical and ideological assistance to tribal outfits in NWFP. However recent attacks show that not only are the Punjabi militants are now more confident in playing a bolder role, but that the Waziristani Taliban may used them as a second front to engage the state while they push back against the military presence in Waziristan. The fact that both the attacks in Rawalpindi and Lahore conspicuously targeted state apparatuses has been a rude awakening for the Government. Once allies, there is an unsettling realization amongst state elements that their previous bedfellows are regrouping with new allies over new set of agendas i.e. to take down the state that they no longer perceive to be Islamic.

Despite the new reality, the government at least officially continues to downplay the existence of the so-called 'Punjabi Taliban.' On one hand the Law Minister of Punjab Rana Sanaullah issued a statement denying any existence of Taliban writ or need for operations in Punjab. At the same time North West Frontier Province Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain urged that militant bases in Punjab had to be eliminated, if the South Waziristan operations were to be successful.

These contradictory statements reflect a lack of consensus on the actual situation and possible friction over what the official strategy towards these militants should be. It also reflects the nervousness amongst the government to come interms with the threat within Punjab, as recognition of such a threat may make it imperative to launch military operations - something the both the Army and government may be unwilling to do. Punjab has historically always been a stable province that has not witnessed any military intervention - a status quo that the state will try to protect as long it can. With the army already engaged on many fronts, it may not be possible for it may not be willing to engage militarily in its own backyard where it faces the risk of division within the ranks based on regional loyalty. This is a concern that the army is quietly honest about and in recent comments of General Athar Abbas to The Guardian, he downplays that the need for military operations in Southern Punjab, because the environment is different from what exists in Swat or South Waziristan.

Ultimately weak state authority means that the government may not easily be able to rein in control of the areas. As Rizvi notes, "There are areas in DG Khan where the government’s authority is weak, which helps the militants to find sanctuary there. Further, the close proximity of these areas to Balochistan and tribal areas of the NWFP also provides the militants an easy escape route.’' In the end, going after these militants may require the state and its intelligence agencies to relinquish any former ties completely. While the state does want to crack down on the militants and curb the spiralling violence, it may be reluctant to entirely let go of its wild card - the possibility that these jihadi groups might be of use again should tensions flare up with India in future.

Meanwhile as military operations are underway in Waziristan, the government is quietly carrying out investigations and crackdowns in Southern Punjab, to arrest any growing links between the two groups that might dilute any gains from the operations. Yet it is only a matter of time before these outfits regroup and find new allies again. "Ultimately we're going to reach a tipping point where the Taliban will have opened so many fronts in Northern Pakistan, in Punjab, that it will be almost impossible for the army to deploy against so many fronts which are so distant from each other geographically," according to Ahmed Rashid, the author of 'Descent into Chaos'.