Clare Short's appearance at the Chilcot Inquiry was in contrast to the dour and deflective testimonies so far. But her plaudits in the press have glossed over what amounts to a blatant attempt to rewrite her embarrassing history, says Kelly Armstrong.

For those of us who rubbed our hands at the prospect of new revelations at the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq War, proceedings have been disappointing, pickings slim.

But following the well-rehearsed and deflective performances of key decision-makers involved in the run-up to the 2003 invasion, Clare Short burst onto the scene on Tuesday with an explosive appearance.

Claiming that she was “conned” by a “deceitful” Tony Blair into supporting the war, the former International Development Secretary proceeded to attack just about anyone and everyone who was around her at the time, including her former master, the cabinet, the Attorney General, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the US government.

The three-hour performance not only earned a round of applause from spectators sat in the public gallery, but praise from all corners of the press. The Sun called her ´a brave woman … brutally honest’, while the Guardian’s political sketch writer Simon Hoggart said that it was the ‘most entertaining evidence we’ve had yet’. His opposite number at the Daily Mail, Quentin Letts, enthused: ‘Finally someone’s giving it a bit of welly … boy her session was fun.’

But like many who preceded her at the inquiry, Short has reinterpreted and repackaged her role in the run-up to war, and the media and public’s judgment must not be clouded by their insatiable appetite to give those they hold responsible for the ensuing mess – namely Blair and his close associates - a black eye.

If we cast our minds back to an interview Short gave to Radio 4´s Westminster Hour on March 9th 2003, less than two weeks before the invasion of Iraq, she stated that her government’s attitude was “deeply reckless”, adding: “If there is not UN authority for military action … I will not uphold a breach of international law or this undermining of the UN and I will resign from the government.” Essentially, without a second UN resolution, Short would walk.

However, in a spectacular U-turn on March 18th – just a day before the House of Commons was due to vote on whether to go to war – Short announced that she would stay on without a second UN resolution and would vote in favour of military action.

This last-minute change of direction dealt a serious blow to the rebels. Short told the press that Tony Blair had persuaded her with an assurance that the UN would have a lead role in the reconstruction of Iraq and that US President George W Bush would restart the Middle East peace process and support the creation of a Palestinian state.

Not only did these concessions bear no relation to Short’s original concerns – the war’s legality and the undermining of the UN – they were at best wishful thinking, at worst delusional fantasy. How could Tony Blair guarantee a lead role for an organisation he had decided to bypass? And who of sound rationale envisaged George Bush becoming the saviour of the Middle East and creator-in-chief of a Palestinian state? For someone with over 20 years of political experience, Short seems to have been “conned” fairly easily.

Furthermore, Short’s point at the inquiry that Lord Goldsmith, the UK´s Attorney General at the time, did not discuss the Foreign Office legal team’s advice that “the use of force was contrary to international law” – thereby misleading her – is irrelevant.

In a statement issued on March 18th 2003 explaining why she would be staying in the cabinet, Short said: “The Attorney General has made clear that military action would be legal under international law. Other lawyers have expressed contrary opinions but for the UK Government, the Civil Service and the military, it is the view of the Attorney General that matters and this is unequivocal.”

In other words, Short was well aware of conflicting legal advice on the legality of a war, but chose to fall into line behind the Attorney General’s final decision.

One Labour cabinet minister who was not so easily “conned” was the Leader of the House of Commons, the late Robin Cook, who announced his resignation the day before Short’s volte-face.

Blair knew that in isolation, the formidable Cook would be easier to sideline, hence the effort he invested to keep Short onboard. Having two cabinet members resign would have signalled serious discontent within the government, and although hindsight tells us this probably wouldn’t have swung the vote, the outcome was anything but a forgone conclusion at the time. Short’s response at the time was that she would be “reflecting overnight” on Cook’s resignation, but her mind was clearly already made up.

Incredibly, when Cook went on to make his superb resignation speech that produced the first ever standing ovation in the House of Commons, Short wasn’t there to hear it. She told the BBC´s Andrew Marr the following day: “I didn’t, I’m afraid, listen to Robin’s speech. I was doing other things.”

Perhaps she should have listened.

Short told the inquiry that Blair’s claim to her that French President Jacques Chirac would block any second resolution was “a deliberate lie … blame the French, concoct the legal authority and off we go.”

But as Cook noted in his speech: “France has been at the receiving end of bucket loads of commentary in recent days. It is not France alone that wants time for more inspections. Germany wants more time for inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections; indeed, at no time have we signed up even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution.”

In other words, the French were not alone in their opposition to a second resolution, so whether or not they would have vetoed it was a moot point.

When Short eventually resigned two months after the invasion, her department was under criticism that its performance in Iraq was woefully inadequate. Sir Kevin Tebbit, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence in 2003, told the inquiry back in December: “The Department for International Development (DfID) felt a second resolution was essential before they could do anything. This meant that it was only late in the day that we were able to get them fully engaged. Their focus on poverty relief rather then backing a strategic objective of the British government meant they were not sure at first if the Iraqi people were quite poor enough to deserve major DfID aid.”

Tebbit´s observations were backed up by Lord Boyce, the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, who told the inquiry: “I though the DfID were particularly uncooperative, as led by Clare Short. You had excellent operators from DfID who were told to sit in a tent and not to do anything … that was the instruction they received.” This criticism no doubt prompted Short’s quip: “He had spent a lot of his life in submarines … and it showed.”

Short’s manipulation of the facts and her role in the run-up to the war is in essence self-serving. Short has criticised Blair for being obsessed with his legacy, but her performance at the inquiry shows she is very much concerned with hers.